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Understanding human behavior from the perspective of normative and descriptive theories depends on
human agents having stable and coherent decision-making preferences. Both utility theory (expected
rational behavior; von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947) and prospect theory, with its certainty equivalent
(CE) method (expected irrational behavior; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992), assume stable behavioral
patterns of risk preferences. In contrast, our research pursues the opposite proposal: Human preferences
(rational or irrational) are not stable; variations in the decision context during risk elicitation determine
people’s preferences even when the utilities of choice options are available. Accordingly, we found
evidence that decision makers reverse their risk preferences between CE tasks with logarithmically
spaced certainty (unequal number of risk-averse and risk-seeking sure options) and linearly spaced
certainty (equal number of risk-averse and risk-seeking sure options). The results revealed that the effect
of probability range (low and high) on preferences, predicted by prospect theory, is an artifact of the
logarithmically spaced sure options. When the sure options were linearly spaced, the probability range
no longer influenced risk preferences, indicating a preference reversal between decision tasks. Our
findings highlight a need to investigate how the predictions of descriptive decision-making theories are
shaped by their risk elicitation methods.
Keywords: risk preferences, preference reversals, prospect theory, probability, decision context
A strong assumption of utility theory (UT; von Neumann &
Morgenstern, 1947) and prospect theory (PT; Tversky & Kahne-
man, 1992) is that decision makers have stable preferences (ratio-
nal or irrational) that guide their choices between alternatives
varying in risk and reward (cf. Birnbaum, 2008; Brandstätter,
Gigerenzer, & Hertwig, 2006; Elster, 1986; Hertwig, Barron, We-
ber, & Erev, 2004; Kusev et al., 2017; Kusev, van Schaik, Ayton,
Dent, & Chater, 2009; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). In contrast, in
this article, we explore the lability of human preferences in risky
decision-making scenarios and argue that human preferences (ra-
tional or irrational) are constructed “on the fly” during risk elici-
tation.
As in any other scientific field, the success of behavioral science
theories is highly dependent on the experimental method used to
validate the predictions of the theory. Accordingly, the certainty
equivalent (CE) method, employed by PT, is arguably one of the
most widely used and robust experimental methods in behavioral
science for measuring decision makers’ risk preferences (Tversky
& Kahneman, 1992). Based on the CE method, Tversky and
Kahneman (1992) confirmed the following PT predictions: Deci-
sion makers are not willing to take risks when there is a high chance
of gaining money or when there is a low chance of losing money;
however, decision makers are willing to take risks when there is a low
chance of gaining money or when there is a high chance of losing
money (see Figure 1). This risk pattern, famously known as the
fourfold pattern of risk preferences, is exemplified in an inverse
S-shaped probability-weighting function—overweighting of low-
probability loss and gain, and underweighting of moderate- and high-
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probability loss and gain (e.g., Kusev et al., 2009; Tversky & Kah-
neman, 1992).
A common feature of experiments with gambling scenarios
employed by PT and its CE method is that distributions of the
certain (sure) decision options are logarithmically spaced and
paired with the risky decision options. For example, Tversky and
Kahneman (1992) used seven certain options, spanning the ex-
treme outcomes of the relevant binary risky prospect. According to
this risk elicitation method, risk preferences (computed from the
sure outcomes chosen in the task: the midpoint between the lowest
accepted value and the highest rejected value in the prospects) with
CE values above the expected value (EV) indicate risk-seeking
preferences, and risk preferences with CE values below the EV
indicate risk-averse preferences.
However, there are four important scaling issues in this widely
used experimental method, which we propose are the sole reason
for the fourfold pattern of risk preference predicted by PT. Con-
sider the following binary choice options—a choice between a
risky Option A and certain Option B.
Prospect Scaling Issue 1:
Option A: A 1% chance of winning £400 (the EV is £4)
or
Option B: A sure gain of (£1, £2.7, £7.3, £20, £54.2, £147.3, and
£400).
Prospect Scaling Issue 2:
Option A: A 1% chance of losing £400 (the EV is –£4)
or
Option B: A sure loss of (–£1, –£2.7, –£7.3, –£20, –£54.2, –£147.3,
and –£400).
Accordingly, with Prospect Scaling Issue 1 (low-probability
gain gambles), participants experience five certain gain options
(£7.3, £20, £54.2, £147.3, and £400) above the EV for the gain
prospects (EV  £4) and only two certain gain options (£1, £2.7)
below the EV. However, with Prospect Scaling Issue 2 (low-
probability loss gambles), participants experience five certain loss
options (–£7.3, –£20, –£54.2, –£147.3 and –£400) below the EV
for the loss prospects (EV  –£4) and only two certain loss options
(–£1, –£2.7) above the EV. Hence, for Prospect Scaling Issue 1,
approximately 72% of gambles offer utilitarian risk-seeking sure
values—above the EV. However, for Prospect Scaling Issue 2,
approximately 72% of gambles offer nonutilitarian risk-averse
sure values—below the EV. Thus, the imbalanced contextual
experience with the certain loss and gain options encourages
risk-averse preferences in the domain of loss and risk-seeking
preferences in the domain of gain. Moreover, there are two further
scaling issues.
Prospect Scaling Issue 3:
Option A: A 99% chance of winning £400 (the EV is £396)
or
Option B: A sure gain of (£1, £2.7, £7.3, £20, £54.2, £147.3, and
£400).
Prospect Scaling Issue 4:
Option A: A 99% chance of losing £400 (the EV is –£396)
or
Option B: A sure loss of (–£1, –£2.7, –£7.3, –£20, –£54.2, –£147.3,
and –£400).
In contrast to Prospect Scaling Issue 1 and 2 (low-probability
gain and loss, respectively), with Prospect Scaling Issue 3 (high-
probability gain gambles), respondents experience six certain gain
options (£1, £2.7, £7.3, £20, £54.2, £147.3) below the EV for the
gain prospects (EV  £396) and only one certain gain option
(£400) above the EV. However, with Prospect Scaling Issue 4
(high-probability loss gambles), respondents experience six certain
loss options (–£1, –£2.7, –£7.3, –£20, –£54.2, –£147.3) above the
EV for the loss prospects (EV  –£396) and only one certain gain
option (–£400) below the EV. Hence, for Prospect Scaling Issue 3,
approximately 86% of gambles offer nonutilitarian risk-averse
sure values—below the EV. However, for Prospect Scaling Issue
4, approximately 86% of gambles offer utilitarian risk-seeking sure
values—above the EV. Thus, the imbalanced contextual experi-
ence with the certain loss and gain options encourages risk-seeking
preferences in the domain of loss and risk-averse preferences in the
domain of gain for high probabilities.
Crucially, we argue that these four prospect-scaling issues ex-
plain the fourfold pattern of risk preferences predicted by PT.
Specifically, we propose that the fourfold pattern of risk prefer-
ences is an artifact of logarithmically scaling the certain decision
options and does not represent a difference in risk preferences for
low and high probabilities. Accordingly, we aim to test patterns of
risky preferences, using logarithmically spaced distributions (that
produce an imbalanced decision-making context) and linearly
spaced distributions (that produce a balanced decision-making
context) in the domains of loss or gain, in which certainty is
linearly varied around the point of the EV. For example, for risky
prospects with 1% chance of winning £400 (EV  £4), there are
three sure options above the EV and three sure options below the
EV: £0.4, £1.6, £ 2.8, £4, £5.2, £6.4, and £7.6 (incremental and
decremental steps of £1.2). Unlike the CE method’s logarithmi-
Figure 1. The fourfold pattern of risk preferences (probability range by
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cally spaced distributions, linearly spaced distributions are bal-
anced around the EV for each probability level. Accordingly,
decision makers will be able to experience all probabilities (low
and high) with the 3 linearly spaced sure outcome options above
the EV, the 3 linearly spaced sure outcome options below the EV
and the sure option equal to the EV.
Moreover, using spacing of sure options as a within-subjects vari-
able, we expect that decision makers will reverse their risk preferences
between CE tasks with logarithmically spaced certainty (unequal
number of risk-averse and risk-seeking sure options) and linearly
spaced certainty (equal number of risk-averse and risk-seeking sure
options). We predict that behavioral preference reversals as two of the
main properties in the fourfold pattern—the effect of low and high
probabilities on risk preferences—will be empirically controlled and
eliminated. Accordingly, we expect that probability will have no
effect on respondents’ preferences for the decision-making prospects
with linearly spaced distributions of the certain options (balanced
around the EV for each probability level).
Method
Participants
Participants were 240 (123 female, 117 male) registered U.K.
users of online survey panels. The statistical power of 2(2)(2)
ANOVA was .85, 1.00, and 1.00 for a small (f  .10,), medium
(f  .25) and large (f  .40) effect size of the repeated-measures
effects of spacing of sure options and probability range as well as
the interaction effects, and .67, 1.00, and 1.00 for the correspond-
ing effect sizes of the independent-measures effect of domain. The
mean age was 42 years (SD  11.43). Respondents took part
individually and received a payment of £1. The experiment re-
ceived departmental research ethics committee approval; all par-
ticipants were treated in accordance with the ethical standards of
the British Psychological Society and APA ethical principles.
Experimental Design and Procedure
A mixed measures 2(2)(2) design was used, with the fol-
lowing independent variables: domain of decision making (loss or
gain), spacing of sure options (logarithmically and linearly spaced
distributions of certainty), and probability range (low, from 1% to
25%, and high, from 50% to 99%). The dependent variable was
respondents’ risk preference.
At the beginning of the study, task instructions, an example
scenario with illustrative choices, and then binary decision-making
tasks were presented to all participants in an online computer-
based experiment. Specifically, respondents were presented with
binary choices (between a probabilistic and certain options) and
then, on each trial, required to choose one of the options. Partic-
ipants completed a series of 126 trials of binary decisions. The
trials of binary decisions with low- and high-probability ranges,
and linearly and logarithmically spaced sure options, were pre-
sented within the domains of loss or gain. All respondents were
sequentially presented with sure options under two types of spac-
ing: logarithmically and linearly spaced sure options. Accordingly,
the order of spacing was counterbalanced across participants (log-
arithmic then linear, or linear then logarithmic).
Decision Stimuli
The decision trials were generated by (a) combining a monetary
amount (£400—probabilistic outcome) with probabilities within
two probability ranges (low  .01, .05, .10, .25; high  .50, .75,
.90, .95, .99); hence, nine probabilistic combinations were pre-
sented with (b) one of seven sure monetary amounts (logarithmi-
cally spaced between £1 and the amount of the probabilistic
outcome [£400] and linearly spaced sure options balanced around
the EV for each probability level [three above and three below the
EV]). Therefore, there were 9 (probabilities)  14 (7 logarithmi-
cally and 7 linearly spaced sure options), for a total of 126 decision
trials.
The following computer algorithm was used to present the
decision trials (loss or gain; between subjects) for each participant:
(a) randomly select a decision task with one type of spacing (e.g.,
gamble-gain with logarithmically spaced sure distributions); (b)
for the monetary amount of £400, randomly select a probability
level; (c) randomly present each of the seven sure monetary
options (logarithmically spaced sure distributions); and (d) go back
to (b) unless all probability levels have been presented—in that
case, go back to (a) and present the task with the other (e.g., linear)
spacing (and repeat Steps a to d for this second task).
The respondents’ CE estimates were based on Tversky and
Kahneman’s (1992) approach—the midpoint between the lowest
accepted sure option and the highest rejected sure option in the
decision prospects. Accordingly, respondents’ risk preferences
(risk-averse or risk-seeking) were calculated for each probability
level based on whether the CE is above (risk-seeking, scored as 0)
or below (risk-averse, scored as 1) the EV for this probability
level.
Results
The results revealed that decision makers reverse their risk prefer-
ences for binary-choice prospects with identical EVs: (a) from risk-
seeking for low-probability (.01–.25) gain and risk-averse for high-
probability (.50–.99) gain (task with logarithmically spaced sure
options) to risk-averse for low- and high-probability gain (task with
linearly spaced sure options); and (b) from risk-averse for low-
probability (.01–.25) loss and risk-seeking for high-probability (.50–
.99) loss (task with logarithmically spaced sure options) to risk-
seeking for low- and high-probability loss (task with linearly spaced
sure options; see Figure 2).
A 2(2)(2) mixed measures ANOVA provided further evi-
dence for these results. The following effects on risk preferences
were significant: domain of decision making, F(1, 238)  254.84,
p  .001, ε2  .21; spacing of sure options by domain of decision
making, F(1, 238)  177.31, p  .001, ε2  .09; probability range
by domain of decision making, F(1, 238)  182.35, p  .001, ε2 
.09; and spacing of sure options by probability range by domain of
decision making, F(1, 238)  249.04, p  .001, ε2  .08.
Because of the significant three-way interaction, the interpreta-
tion of two-way interaction effects and main effects was precluded.
Simple-effect tests by spacing of the sure options showed that for
linear spacing, only the main effect of domain was significant, F(1,
238)  503.64, p  .001, ε2  .58. Thus, the results revealed a
twofold pattern of risk preferences; respondents’ preferences were
risk-averse in the domain of gain (M  .87; 95% CI [.83, .91]) and
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In contrast, participants’ pattern of risk preferences changed
when spacing of the sure options was logarithmic. For logarithmic
spacing, the main effect of domain of decision making, F(1,
238)  15.24, p  .001, ε2  .02, and the interaction effect of
domain of decision making by probability range, F(1, 238) 
331.39, p  .001, ε2  .34, were significant.
Follow-up analysis for logarithmic spacing showed that the
effect of probability range was significant in the domain of gain,
t(119)  13.16, p  .001, d  1.45; respondents’ preferences
were risk-seeking for low-probability gain (M  .31; 95% CI [.25,
.39]) and risk-averse for high-probability gain (M  .82; 95% CI
[.77, .87]).
In contrast, the significant effect of probability range in the
domain of loss was in the opposite direction, t(119)  12.59, p 
.001, d  1.50; respondents’ risk preferences were risk-averse for
low-probability loss (M  .68; 95% CI [.61, .75]) and risk-seeking
for high-probability loss (M  .19; 95% CI [.15, .24]). Hence, our
results show a fourfold pattern of risk preferences when spacing
was logarithmic, as predicted by PT.
Discussion
The results from the experiment revealed a change in respon-
dents’ decision-making preferences for binary-choice prospects
with identical EVs. We found evidence that decision makers
reverse their risk preferences between risk elicitation tasks
with logarithmically spaced certainty (unequal number of risk-
averse and risk-seeking sure options) and linearly spaced cer-
tainty (equal number of risk-averse and risk-seeking sure op-
tions).
Moreover, respondents’ risk preferences were not influenced by
the range of probability within the domains of loss and gain, when
the distributions of the sure options were linear. Accordingly,
when spacing of the sure options was linear, the results indicated
a twofold pattern of risk preferences (risk-averse in the domain of
gain and risk-seeking in the domain of loss). In contrast, when
spacing of the sure options was logarithmic, respondents’ risk
preferences followed the fourfold pattern of risk preferences pre-
dicted by PT (see Figure 2).
These findings support our predictions that human decision-
making preferences are constructed during risk elicitation and
that the probability range effect, and thus the fourfold pattern of
risk preferences, is an artifact of logarithmically spacing the
distributions of certainties. This is because logarithmic spacing
of certain options biased respondents toward (a) risk aversion
for low-probability loss and high-probability gain, as there were
more risk-averse than risk-seeking sure options; and (b) risk-
seeking for low-probability gain and high-probability loss, as
there were more risk-seeking than risk-averse sure options.
Accordingly, employing linearly spaced certain options with an
equal number of risk-averse and risk-seeking sure options (bal-
anced around the EV of the risky option for each probability
level) eliminates the effect of probability on risk preferences.
Figure 2. Risk preferences by spacing, domain of decision making, and probability range. Mean values and
error bars (95% confidence interval of the mean) correspond to the respondents’ risk preference patterns (0 
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This finding is crucial, as the probability-weighting function in
PT, which represents the fourfold pattern of risk preferences, uses
data obtained from CE methods, (e.g., Tversky & Fox, 1995;
Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). Moreover, the decision weight given
to the probability in the probability-weighting function takes into
account the diminishing sensitivity (insensitivity in the middle of
the probability scale) and probability discriminability (elevation;
Gonzalez & Wu, 1999; Kusev et al., 2009; Tversky & Kahneman,
1992). However, none of these theoretical assumptions are plau-
sible or possible with a twofold (gain and loss) pattern of risk
preferences, in which decision makers do not reverse their prefer-
ences for low and high probabilities within the domains of loss and
gain.
Our findings are consistent with other empirical results demon-
strating preference lability (e.g., Kusev et al., 2017; Lichtenstein &
Slovic, 1971; Slovic, 1995; Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1983; Stewart,
Chater, Stott, & Reimers, 2003). We therefore highlight a need to
investigate how the predictions of decision theories are shaped by
their data elicitation methods. We envisage that our research will
inform behavioral decision-making theories and their methods
about the pitfalls of imbalanced varying of monetary amounts and
probabilities. These variations can create a disproportionate expe-
rience with the values (below and above the EV) and potentially
induce decision biases.
Context of the Research
The impetus for the collaboration on this project came with the
support of the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science. In this
collaboration, we aimed to further extend our ongoing research on
stability and coherence of human preferences (Kusev et al., 2009,
2017). The foundation of behavioral economics (UT and PT) is the
idea that people have predictable, stable, and coherent preferences
(rational or irrational). These two theories have been cited in
journals ranging in topic from applied psychology and cognitive
neuroscience to economics, law, and philosophy. We successfully
established that respondents’ risk preferences are (a) not stable
psychological constructs, (b) constructed during risk elicitation,
and (c) not influenced by probability range. Future research will
examine whether the lability of human preferences has evolution-
ary support.
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